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Abstract— The world of online advertising is directly 
dependent on data collection of the online browsing habits of 
individuals to enable effective advertisement targeting and 
retargeting. However, these data collection practices can cause 
leakage of private data belonging to website visitors (end-
users) without their knowledge. The growing privacy concern 
of end-users is amplified by a lack of trust and understanding 
of what and how advertisement trackers are collecting and 
using their data. This paper presents an investigation to restore 
the trust or validate the concerns. We aim to facilitate the 
assessment of the actual end-user related data being collected 
by advertising platforms (APs) by means of a critical 
discussion but also the development of a new tool, AdPExT 
(Advertising Parameter Extraction Tool), which can be used to 
extract third-party parameter key-value pairs at an individual 
key-value level. Furthermore, we conduct a survey covering 
mostly United Kingdom-based frequent internet users to 
gather the perceived sensitivity sentiment for various 
representative tracking parameters. End-users have a definite 
concern with regards to advertisement tracking of sensitive 
data by global dominating platforms such as Facebook and 
Google.  
Keywords— AdPExT, online advertising, tool, privacy, trust, 
advertising platforms, GDPR, Sensitivity Perception 
I. INTRODUCTION 
A recent Gartner study found that marketing budgets in 
the United Kingdom and the United States will rise to 12% 
of company revenue in 2017 and this is largely due to 
website-based advertising even though there is a known 
increase in ad-blockers [1]. These budget increases are in 
part due to improved targeting by advertising platforms who 
build and sell visitor cookies in grouped bundles called 
“audiences” to enable effective retargeting and this practice 
is evolving exponentially with advanced data merging, 
cookie syncing and data analytics. This eco-system is 
dependent on web tracking data by third-parties and end-
users that visit websites where advertisements are shown are 
concerned about their data being collected and whether they 
can trust the practices of the data collectors. This research 
investigates these practices in detail. 
There are three main entities involved in the online 
advertisement process (apart from the end-user): the 
advertiser, publisher and advertising platform [2]. The 
Advertiser, also known as retailer, is the company that has a 
service or product to sell or promote (e.g. EasyJet) and they 
generally buy advertising space to generate interest and 
brand knowledge from website visitors (end-users) that could 
lead to a direct visit from a click on the advertisement or a 
future visit or purchase. The Publisher is the owner of the 
website where the advertisement is shown (e.g. the Daily 
Mail) and they are paid for showing the advertisement. The 
Advertising Platform (AP) connects publishers with 
advertisers (e.g. Google and AppNexus) and Estrada-
Jiménez et al. (suggests that APs represent the heart of online 
advertising through merging user interests with the relevant 
advertisers [2], [3]. It is important to note that one publisher 
can have multiple APs tracking their site at the same time 
(e.g. the Daily Mail normally has more than sixty APs active 
on their website). The modern AP consists of various sub-
entities (including ad networks and ad exchanges) that 
facilitate advanced targeting, data merging and advertising 
optimisations. Fig. 1 presents a diagram influenced by 
Estrada-Jiménez et al. (2017) study of the online advertising 
environment and how these entities interact [2]. 
Fig. 1. Main Online Advertising Environment Entities 
To track and target website visitors, APs drop a file 
(cookie) onto a visitor’s computer and then build and update 
a user profile linked to the cookie that is used to target the 
visitor with relevant adverts. The user cookie and data 
https://sampleAPsubdomain.com/page.html?param_key1=par
am_val1&param_key2=param_val2 
 
transmission to and from the AP are managed through a 
JavaScript-based tracking code (pixel) or a transparent 1x1 
image (image pixel) which posts the data through URL 
parameters during the HTTP request-response protocol 
transmission. This is demonstrated in Fig. 2, influenced by 
Puglisi, Rebollo-Monedero and Forne (2016) study) [4]. This 
tracking is referred to as Third-party tracking since it is 
activated by URL domains that belong to the APs (e.g. 
google.com) and not the publisher’s local domain (e.g. 
dailymail.co.uk). Parameters can be noted within the third-
party URL strings as everything that follows the question 
mark (“?”) with each parameter key and value being 
separated by an equal sign (“=”) and different parameter key-
value pairs separated with an ampersand (“&”). For example, 
in the string presented in Fig. 3 the parameter key 
“param_key1” has the value “param_val1” while 
“param_key2” has the value “param_val2”. 
Fig. 2. Tracking parameter transfer via HTTP request and response 
process 
Fig. 3. Sample URL string with parameter keys and values  
User profile based Targeted Advertising is effective and 
beneficial to the advertiser since it can increase revenue up to 
2.68 times and it benefits the visitor with personalised 
adverts while enabling a high amount of free content all over 
the internet, but it can also pose a significant privacy and 
security risk to end-users [2], [3], [5], [6], [7], [8], [9]. Some 
of the main concerns over advertisement tracking is privacy 
disclosure during retargeting and data merging of third-party 
tracked data from various sites and sources (including ISPs) 
which can be used to build personally intrusive profiles of 
individuals [2], [3], [4], [5], [8], [10]. Increasingly IP 
addresses, browsers, e-mails and mobile devices contain or 
identify user location information (sometimes with GPS 
accuracy) which is collected by APs to amend and improve 
advert relevancy even though end-users are not explicitly 
aware of this [2], [3], [6], [8].  
Browsers are making it easier for users to delete their 
cookies and some like Safari block third-party cookies 
(cookies from sites not directly visited) by default. To 
circumvent this occurrence trackers can use Device 
Fingerprinting (also known as Stateless Tracking) whereby 
the device and browser information (collected through the 
tracking parameters) is used to build a user profile across 
multiple sites and browsers when cookies have been deleted 
or blocked and in some cases the original cookies are 
recreated (respawned) on the user’s computer after deletion 
[2], [6], [9], [11], [12]. These recreated cookies are 
sometimes referred to as “zombie cookies” [13].  
Various Ad-blocking systems and techniques are 
available, and they can be effective for more advanced users, 
but they can also cause site breakage which can then cause 
users to disable them [9], [13]. The IAB reported that 45% of 
people state they are less likely to use ad-blockers if it does 
not affect their browsing directly, but ad-blocking still grew 
by 30% globally in 2016 with an estimated quarter of all 
internet users reported to be using these blockers by end 
2016 [14], [15]. The online advertising industry’s 
dependency on tracking data collection and processing to 
enable effective re-targeting means blocking poses a direct 
threat to the advertising ecosystem and blocking tools will 
continuously be opposed or bypassed by APs which creates a 
false sense of security to ad-blocking users [12], [15].  
The increase in data mining techniques and processing 
capacity exposes the threat of unintentional privacy leakage. 
Publishers that transfer user data including address details 
and user identifiers between their own website pages via 
URL parameters can leak these metrics to third-parties that 
collect the URL strings, albeit unintentionally [13], [16]. 
This information can contribute to fingerprinting techniques 
and provide details to third-parties that can reveal sensitive 
information without the knowledge of end-users or even the 
direct knowledge of the publisher [6]. 
Trust is an important element when these users consider 
the release of their private information to third-parties and in 
addition to brand trust, the website privacy policies are 
expected to provide a clear picture with regards to the use of 
private and sensitive data, although this is not always the 
case with some privacy policies being vague, unnecessarily 
long or just full of legal wording that is difficult to 
comprehend. Previous surveys have found that end-users are 
not always aware that their browsing activity and sensitive 
information including their location is being collected by 
third-parties and when informed they are opposed to the 
practice and surprised that they were not better informed by 
the website they are visiting [6], [13], [17]. There is an 
immediate and increasing need for website visitors to have 
more clarity about what is being done with their tracked data 
and there is a lack of clear existing research to investigate the 
actual parameter collection practices and the variance from 
privacy policies [5]. 
The aim of this paper is to design a tool that can be used 
to assess the information gleaned from browsers when 
websites provide advertising space served by online 
advertising platforms (APs). This information can be used to 
ascertain privacy concerns and identify inaccurate privacy 
statements for a subset of APs. Therefore, this study creates 
and uses a new application to extract the various website 
visitor parameters (cookie ID, IP address, browser, etc.) that 
are collected by online APs when an online advert is shown. 
Our aim was addressed by achieving two main objectives 
related to the tools development and user perception of 
privacy issues related to the parameters collected by APs.  
The first objective can be described as to design and 
implement a method to read website tracking parameters 
from online websites. During this stage of the work, design 
attention will be given to related tracking tools and how their 
techniques can be integrated and evolved when applicable. 
The expected output for objective one is a process flow 
diagram of the new method including research sources and 
proof of concept code. The second objective covers users’ 
perceptions. This is more concerned with perceiving and 
understanding which parameters collected by APs are 
considered more private by end-users compared to what they 
are more willing to share. 
 The research scope has been defined to control the 
quality and duration of the design and validation process. 
The design was created within a VirtualBox virtual machine 
within the United Kingdom with a focus on the use of the 
Mozilla Firefox browser for any testing purposes (Proof-of-
Concept). Online tracking within mobile and tablet browsers 
and apps is outside the scope of our testing but we believe 
that our results can be generalised and extended to these 
other environments. Furthermore, we will survey end-users 
in response to objective two with a focus on the United 
Kingdom. 
 In the remaining part of this paper, we review the 
literature and related work in Section II, demonstrate the 
design of the new tool namely AdPExT supported by a link 
to its source code within Section III. The design and results 
of the sensitivity perception survey will be presented in 
Section IV. Finally, conclusions and future work are shared 
in Section V. 
II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The privacy concern related to online tracking is well 
documented, but still contemporary, unresolved and expected 
to increase since the introduction of the EU GDPR 
legislation enforcement in May 2018 [20]. Specific relevant 
papers are noted in this section following a literature review 
related to third-party online tracking privacy data.  
A. User Identification 
To sustain the thriving advertising industry, advertising 
platforms (APs) track unique users across multiple sites and 
devices which allow them to build and update a user profile 
enabling them to effectively target the user with relevant 
advertising content. Various literature examines how cross-
site user tracking is achieved online.  
Puglisi, Rebollo-Monedero and Forne (2016) analyse the 
methods employed by APs to build user profiles across 
different sites and devices and investigate the accuracy of 
these profiles while considering the privacy risk and how 
adverts are amended depending on user profiles [4]. It is 
found that profiles are built quickly across only a few web 
page visits which then allow adverts to be adjusted 
accordingly and they suggest data obfuscation and user 
profile visualisation tools are required to preserve privacy 
and inform users [4]. The research result is somewhat vague 
on the accuracy of profiles built during testing but provides 
some proof of how swiftly such profiles can affect what 
users are exposed to. 
Beck (2015) highlights the industry practice of online 
tracking across both the visible digital identity which users 
are aware of and the invisible digital identity which APs can 
build by combining data from various sites and user actions 
[5]. The research concludes that more education is required 
with regards to online tracking and privacy and that future 
research is needed to expose the actual parameters collected 
by APs [5]. This suggestion is directly in line with the aim of 
this research paper. 
With a similar focus Acar et al. (2013) demonstrate 
FPDetective as their framework to detect and analyse web-
based fingerprinting (tracking via device signatures) and 
analyse one million websites to find that fingerprinting is 
quite pervasive and counter fingerprinting tools like the Tor 
Browser and Firegloves from Firefox are ineffective [11]. 
They raise concern that web-users are in general unaware of 
(or do not understand) web-based fingerprinting and 
although some third-party privacy policies might mention 
fingerprinting, the websites implementing those third-party 
scripts rarely do [11]. Fingerprinting is not as trustworthy 
(for unique user identification) as user cookies since multiple 
computers can have the same fingerprint, and although 
FPDetective is a good tool to detect it, without an effective 
method to avoid fingerprinting the tool has limited 
progressive value. 
Jain, Javed and Paxson (2016) developed a methodology 
to detect unofficial and usable user identifiers via network 
traffic analysis (mainly HTTPS request elements) and 
examines the traffic at the border of an enterprise network 
for fifteen days [6]. Their method identifies repeated strings 
in the network traffic (not contained in the cookie header 
information) which are then manually approved by an 
analyst. The research concludes that a fair amount of first-
party as well as third-party identifiers are transmitted through 
various techniques including HTTP headers, URL 
parameters and non-HTTP messages [6]. These findings 
emphasise the lack of transparency from third-party trackers 
(knowingly as well as unknowingly) and further justifies the 
need for more detailed third-party tracker parameter 
investigations in relation with what is declared by trackers. 
From a data aggregation perspective Rao, Schaub and 
Sadeh (2015) highlighted a concern related to data from 
various sources (including offline sources) being combined 
to build behavioural profiles of individuals [8]. The 
accessible cookie-based profiles of BlueKai, Google and 
Yahoo are found to sometimes include full names and 
addresses, albeit with poor accuracy and the data aggregation 
processes provide detailed profiles of individuals in contrast 
to claims of anonymity by the companies [8]. These research 
findings are in line with the concerns raised within the 
GDPR with regards to extensive privacy violations occurring 
when data from multiple sources are combined and this 
concern will increase with the improvements of behavioural 
profiles built through machine learning [21], [22]. 
B. Detecting New and Unsavoury Tracking Practices 
With the ever-expanding internet and exponential 
increases in advertisers and advertisement practices, it is 
difficult to stay abreast of the latest tracking practices based 
purely on what APs reveal. There is a need to easily and 
automatically capture the tracking cookies and data to allow 
for in-depth data investigations and the following literature 
provides such solutions. 
Purra and Carlsson (2017) released a measurement 
platform that captures web request and response headers and 
then evaluates third-party tracking by differentiating tracking 
types (including advertising), site popularity and reach, and 
the use of HTTP and HTTPS protocols by publishers [7]. 
The extensive site crawl across more than 130 million sites 
found that HTTPS usage by publishers correlates with an 
increase in trackers and that the more well-known APs are by 
far more widely used with Google being the most prolific 
tracker detected [7]. It is interesting to note that the 
implementation of HTTPS by publishers does not mean less 
third-party tracking is in place, although at least the 
encrypted traffic is less susceptible to privacy leakage 
through sniffing. 
Mayer and Mitchell (2012) presents the FourthParty 
third-party web-tracking data extract tool and discusses the 
techniques and risks related to third-party tracking [13]. 
Their tool works as a Firefox browser extension and stores 
results within an SQLite database [13]. This tool is one of the 
first efficient third-party tracking data extraction tools and 
the research discussion provides good detail of the various 
third-party tracking and blocking techniques in use, although 
it does not address any of the concerns with regards to actual 
data collection versus user perception and privacy policy 
statements. 
By building on the FourthParty system Englehardt and 
Narayanan (2016) created the OpenWPM Python package 
and then scrapes the top one million websites (as per 
Alexa.com in January 2016) to analyse various tracking 
methods including cookie and device fingerprint-based 
tracking, browser-based privacy tools and their effect as well 
as cookie syncing techniques (third-parties sharing cookies) 
[16]. The research confirms the effectiveness of their 
OpenWPM platform, detects a large amount of cookie 
syncing (90% of the top fifty third-parties) and confirms the 
effectiveness of third-party cookie blocking by Firefox and 
Ghostery [16], [29]. This is important research that provides 
a platform for future research with the efficient OpenWPM 
package and delivers a considerable overview of various 
third-party tracking techniques and practices that are not 
widely known by the average internet user. 
C. Ad-blockers 
The increase in advertisement tracking awareness and 
privacy concerns by end-users are driving a large uptake of 
ad-blocking tools like Ghostery, Disconnect, AdBlock and 
Adblock Plus, but often these browser-based tools are 
outdated (i.e. new APs are not on their block lists), are 
detected by websites which then request (or force) them to be 
disabled or break the website structure such that the user 
cannot effectively use the website. The following recent 
research attempts to address this concern through new 
privacy-enhancing blocking methods. 
Wu et al. (2015) proposed a new machine learning based 
system to detect and block third-party tracker scripts 
automatically based on their actions and signatures and 
validated a high level of accuracy although future 
improvements are suggested [12]. The concern with this 
approach is that without the ability to optimise targeting 
much of the internet content will need to be changed to paid 
access models and the site-breakage concern is not 
addressed. 
A somewhat more sustainable solution is proposed by Yu 
et al. (2016) through a novel approach to online tracking 
privacy improvement where users identify data they believe 
can uniquely identify them [9]. The researcher tests their new 
system that removes this data from third-party data requests 
in real-time across 200,000 users in Germany and find that 
this approach achieves better protection than the well-known 
ad-blocker Disconnect, causes less website and 
advertisement tracking breakage (than other ad-blockers) and 
concludes that they could block user identifiers across 78% 
of their test sites [9]. The removal of sensitive data 
parameters will improve website visitor privacy protection, 
but APs that are affected by this method could start to 
encrypt these data parameters before transmission to 
circumvent the data removal. 
D. Trust in Advertising 
The younger generation are growing up with easy access 
to everything everywhere, but they also better understand the 
online world and its various hazards. With a better 
understanding of the information that browsers could collect 
about them (including location information), these 
increasingly heavy web users browse with less trust. The 
effect of trust on advertising is considered by these recent 
literature papers. 
Cottrill and 'Vonu' Thakuriah (2013) reviews public and 
private sector privacy policies to ascertain how well end-
users can comprehend them and how privacy is addressed in 
general as well as whether website visitor location privacy 
elements are explicitly addressed [17]. The research finds 
that there is a definitive lack of focus on privacy policies 
with regards to location-based data collection and sharing 
and that different industry sectors address privacy 
inconsistently. They suggest some privacy policy guidelines 
to address location-based data concerns [17]. Although this 
privacy policy analysis concentrates on location information, 
it highlights the lack of clarity within some privacy policies 
that could provide a false sense of security to end-users and 
undermine trust. 
More directly Bleier and Eisenbeiss (2015) studied how 
effective retargeting is in relation to the user’s trust of 
advertisers by considering the accuracy (depth) and the 
number of interest items correctly covered within an advert 
(breadth) of banner adverts [10]. They find that advertisers 
with higher consumer trust can get effective results with 
increased depth and less breadth without raising concerns 
about privacy from end-users [10]. Trust is very important in 
the internet world where there are seemingly always other 
options for customers to switch to and this research 
emphasises the importance for websites to be transparent and 
honest within their privacy policies to ensure trust is built 
and maintained. 
E. Limiting Online Privacy Leakage 
Privacy leakage is one of the main concerns with the 
advances in online tracking, data merging and data analytics. 
This allows sensitive or private information collected by 
third-parties to be more easily found, shared and used 
without the end-user’s explicit knowledge. The following 
research papers investigated this concern and some proposed 
changes to the ad delivery model. 
Estrada-Jiménez et al. (2017) examines the advertising 
tracking infrastructure and privacy technologies and 
performs a survey to compare privacy mechanisms [2]. They 
conclude that the existing ad delivery model needs 
significant modification before visitor privacy can be 
effectively improved [2]. The finding seems almost obvious, 
but with this research proof, the next step should be to find 
ad delivery methodology that can protect end-users while 
also ensuring advertising revenue generation. 
  
Fig. 4. Online Tracking Privacy Literature Review BOK 
 
One such option is provided by Wang et al. (2015) who 
stresses the concern around aggressive ad-brokers that can 
abuse private information during tracking and targeting and 
suggests a new framework that uses compensation to 
incentivise website visitors for the use of their private 
information and allows end-users to control the level of 
sensitive and private information that is shared [3]. This 
model has real potential to bridge AP requirements and 
visitor protection. 
A seemingly similar but more thorough methodology is 
suggested by Tran, Acs and Castelluccia (2017) who offers 
an advertisement retargeting system that circumvents the risk 
of unwanted privacy leakage to third-parties through utilising 
user-localised profiles that are homomorphically encrypted 
and shared with APs during the Real-Time Bidding (RTB) 
process [23]. Homomorphic encryption negates the need to 
decrypt encrypted data before calculations are performed on 
it and doing this encryption on the user’s computer avoids 
speed concerns during RTB and ensures privacy 
confidentiality [23], [24]. This is a surprisingly innovative 
and feasible approach that would mitigate many malicious 
attack vectors exposed through third-party JavaScript 
tracking and resolves advertising industry struggles to 
balance user privacy and effective targeting. It will still 
require a big effort to roll out, but the wide-ranging benefits 
should make this realistic. 
F. Gaps in the Literature 
The extensive tracking privacy-related literature review 
in the earlier part of this literature review section is presented 
visually within a Body of Knowledge (BOK) diagram in Fig. 
4. We highlight the gaps in the literature with red icons 
indicating that there is a lack of clarity with regards to 
sensitivity perception of end-users towards the actual 
parameters being collected by third-parties for the use of 
advertising purposes. We also describe the actual data being 
collected. 
III. DESIGNING ADPEXT 
To collect and categorise third-party parameter data 
belonging to advertising platforms (APs), a method was 
required that could read these parameters from websites at an 
individual parameter level and in a timely manner. No 
existing tool could be found through literature and internet 
searches that completely satisfied this need and a new tool 
called the Advertising Parameter Extract Tool (AdPExT) 
was designed as presented in this research paper to enable 
this study and improve efficiency for future researchers. The 
tool can be downloaded from a GitHub repository 
(https://github.com/waldu/AdPExT). 
 
 
https://stats.g.doubleclick.net/r/collect?v=1&aip=1&t=dc&_r=3&
tid=UA-1645798-21&cid=927237433.1498998715&jid=420245 
892&gid=519006367.1498998715&gjid=1657828343&v=j56&z
=661177318 
 
During the design research phase, it was found that 
although various Python packages exist to help to scrape data 
from websites (Django, Selenium, urllib2, BeautifulSoup4, 
html5lib, PyQt5, requests, lxlm, mechanicalsoup), the 
majority do not collect the third-party JavaScript or image 
pixel parameters transferred as part of the HTTP request to 
APs [25], [26]. This is seemingly specifically challenging 
due to it not being part of the page source. A website’s 
HTML elements (i.e. the page source) can be scraped with a 
small amount of code, but integrating the third-party HTTP 
request elements required more advanced methods and it was 
found that the OpenWPM project by Englehardt provided the 
most efficient way to achieve this [19]. Furthermore, 
OpenWPM best simulates a true user experience (albeit 
without user login processes) with full-featured browser 
usage rather than a stripped-down browser version as is 
generally employed during web scraping automation. For 
example, some websites have been found to not serve ads to 
the well-known Python web scraping library PhantomJS 
[16]. 
Fig. 5. Third-party URL with parameters as collected by OpenWPM 
(Englehardt, 2016) 
The OpenWPM Python package populates the HTTP 
request and response information (captured during the page 
load) into the “http_requests” and “http_responses” tables in 
an SQLite database and the third-party tracking scripts along 
with the parameter data are inserted into the URL columns in 
these tables as one string. Fig. 5 shows an example of the 
DoubleClick (owned by Google) tracking image URL string 
with the parameter information after the question mark (“?”). 
For this research into online advertisement tracking these 
parameters needed to be broken up into individual key and 
value pairings to allow for the detailed categorisation and 
analysis and thus the OpenWPM project needed to be 
extended. During testing, it was found that the third-party 
tracking data URLs that were added into the “http_requests” 
and “http_responses” tables are the same in both tables and 
thus the parameter cleansing process design only focused on 
one of the tables (“http_responses”). The new coding was 
done in Python since OpenWPM is a Python library and the 
researcher had familiarity with the programming language. 
All new files and SQLite tables created with AdPExT were 
prefixed with “msc_” for easy identification within the 
research paper and database.  
A. Pre-design Validation 
Pre-design validation was run before the extensive design 
process to ensure the planned data extraction and parameter 
cleansing method was reliable. A manual data retrieval was 
completed for www.smallestwebsitetotheworld.com and 
www.reddit.com of two relevant third-party AP parameter 
strings (from different AP sub-domains) in real-time through 
the Mozilla Firefox browser’s network monitor [18]. To 
extract the parameter data via the OpenWPM library new 
proof of concept (POC) code was created and run for the two 
test URLs.  
The first test was specifically done with 
www.smallestwebsitetotheworld.com to reduce the data 
noise. It can be noted in Table I that for this website the 
Google Analytics tracking URL and parameters collected via 
the POC code is very similar to the URL and parameters of 
the browser network monitor in Fig. 6. Not all the values 
within this comparison are the same and this is expected 
since the data collection session is automatically closed 
during the OpenWPM code execution and the parameters 
from the network monitor information in Fig. 6 is from a 
separate manual session a few minutes later albeit within the 
same computer and browser. This close similarity provides 
proof that the OpenWPM library collects the correct third-
party parameters in sufficient detail as required for the 
research aim. 
 
Fig. 6. www.smallestwebsitetotheworld.com manual data validation for 
Google Analytics image pixel 
TABLE I.  WWW.SMALLESTWEBSITETOTHEWORLD.COM DATA 
COLLECTED FOR METHOD VALIDATION 
Website URL 
where data 
collected from 
Third-party tracking URL request with 
parameters 
http://www.sma
llestwebsitetoth
eworld.com/ 
http://www.google-
analytics.com/r/collect?v=1&_v=j56&a=214507101
&t=pageview&_s=1&dl=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.s
mallestwebsitetotheworld.com%2F&ul=en-
us&de=UTF-
8&dt=SMALLEST%20WEBSITE%20TO%20THE
%20WORLD&sd=24-
bit&sr=1920x975&vp=1366x697&je=0&fl=11.2%2
0r202&_u=IEBAAEABI~&jid=802918663&gjid=1
496508818&cid=1362621894.1500218735&tid=U
A-56270256-
2&_gid=1256393134.1500218735&_r=1&z=18518
36601 
The further validation across a much bigger and tracker-
heavy website www.reddit.com succeeded as well with the 
“quantserve” pixel reflected in both the data and the manual 
screen print via the browser network monitor tool. 
B. Design  
The process required to collect the third-party AP 
parameter information from websites is shown in Fig. 7 and 
it covers the initialisation and setup processes, data collection 
via the OpenWPM package and the parameter cleansing 
process which provide the individual key-value pairs [19]. 
Three new Python files (“msc_Collectdata.py”, 
“msc_UseOpenWPM” and “msc_PramCleansing.py”) were 
created to facilitate this OpenWPM extension and their main 
functions are described in this section along with 
clarification around the additional database expansion 
required to hold the new parameter detail as well as the 
eventual categorisation and AP mappings. 
 Fig. 7. AdPExT Third-party Parameter Data Collection Process Flow 
a) Launching ADPExT: msc_Collectdata.py 
A new Python “launch” file was created as 
“msc_Collectdata.py” which imports the OpenWPM Python 
library as well as the relevant required functions from the 
new “msc_ParamCleansing” library. The “msc_” prefix is 
also defined as a variable within this code file to allow for 
easy amendment during testing or by future researchers. The 
function “get_site_urls_to_extract” contains the list of web 
URLs that will be crawled and when this launch file is 
activated it sends this list to the “extract_via_openwpm” 
function in the “msc_UseOpenWPM” library and once the 
data is collected the parameter cleansing process is activated 
via the “extract_parameters” function from the 
“msc_ParamCleansing” library. 
b) Activating OpenWPM Data Collection: 
msc_UseOpenWPM.py 
The Python file “msc_UseOpenWPM” is based on the 
“demo.py” demonstration file provided by Englehardt 
although it was rewritten to fit into this extended code 
process [19]. After importing the OpenWPM 
“TaskManager” function from the “automation” library, a 
function called “extract_via_openwpm” activates the 
OpenWPM data collection with one active browser that 
processes each provided website URL consecutively. 
c) Database Operations and Parameter Cleansing: 
msc_PramCleansing.py 
The “msc_PramCleansing.py” Python file manages the 
database connections (function “open_db_conn”), additional 
table creations (function “setup_db_tables”), extraction of 
individual parameter key-value pairs (function 
“extract_parameters”) as well as writing the key-value pairs 
into the database (function “add_param_into_db”). Using 
Python rather than SQLite to extract the key-value pairs 
within the “extract_parameters” function is very efficient 
with only one database hit performed to retrieve all the 
collected third-party URLs that contain parameter data (i.e. 
containing “?” in the URL string) before using a Python list 
variable and Python “split” function to separate out the 
parameter keys and values as pairs that are then written into 
the database table “msc_param_values”. 
 
 
Fig. 8. Tables created for this research 
d) Database Expansion 
OpenWPM creates the SQLite database as per the 
configuration in a JSON file located in the 
“OpenWPM/automation” folder which by default stores the 
database file as “crawl-data.sqlite” within a desktop folder 
“openwpm”. In addition to the ten OpenWPM tables that are 
automatically created, for AdPExT a further seven tables 
(shown in Fig. 8) were created to facilitate the parameter 
cleansing and categorisation. The main table is 
“msc_param_values” which contains the separated parameter 
key-values and is linked to the APs in the 
“msc_ad_platform” table and the classification in the 
“msc_param_classification” table. The remaining tables are 
used during the classification process to identify various keys 
and values of interest for the research. 
e) Design Challeneges 
The design process had a few struggles that is noteworthy 
for future researchers utilising AdPExT. The SQLite 
database in use sometimes gets locked for an unknown 
reason. The problem seems to be related to the loops writing 
to the database, but although the newly written code 
implements explicit database connection close commands 
(i.e. “conn.close()”) the issue persists intermittently. Running 
the connection close command manually sometimes released 
the lock, but most often the best solution was to save 
everything and restart the VirtualBox computer. 
Additionally, the Sqliteman software within the virtual 
machine would sometimes freeze and require to be closed 
and re-opened which would lose all unsaved SQLite code 
within the platform. Frequent backups are proposed and 
versions of Sqliteman after V1.2.2 might resolve this issue. 
Additionally, the current code method does not log into 
websites or share any user name, address and e-mail data to 
detect whether that info is tracked. 
IV. SENSITIVITY PERCEPTION SURVEY 
As part of this study, we investigated the perception of 
Internet users towards the sensitivity of the several tracking 
parameters gathered by APs. 
 Fig. 9. Survey Questions Flow 
A. Survey Design 
Google Forms provides an easy, clear and reportable 
survey engine with an online form that could be shared 
across numerous contact streams and social media platforms 
[27]. The survey question flow (Fig. 9) was structured to 
ensure explicit consent is provided by respondents before 
any survey questions are shown and answered based on 
guidance from SurveyMonkey [28]. The first page of the 
survey stipulates the purpose of the survey and provides clear 
terms and conditions that the respondent needs to agree with. 
On agreement, four non-personal questions are put to the 
respondent to determine their age group, employment status, 
country and frequency of use of the internet. These metrics 
assist to measure the appropriateness of the audience with 
regards to the research aim and objectives. Finally, the last 
section of the survey provides ten clear sample parameter 
types that APs might collect and request the respondent to 
rate how sensitive they consider these parameters to be 
according to a categorical scale of sensitivity from one 
(public knowledge) to five (high risk) as shown in Table II. 
TABLE II.  PERCEIVED DATA SENSITIVITY CATEGORIES 
Perceived 
Sensitivity 
Category Description 
Sensitivity 
Score 
Public 
Knowledge 
I do not care about this data 1 
Insensitive Not concerned about this 2 
Sensitive 
I am somewhat concerned about 
this 
3 
Private 
I am concerned about this and 
will want to know this is being 
collected 
4 
High Risk 
I would not freely allow this 
information to be collected by 
3rd parties and want explicit 
notification 
5 
The survey was distributed mainly within the United 
Kingdom through online methods including direct e-mail to 
the researcher’s contacts, postings on Facebook and 
LinkedIn and additional distribution amongst professional 
contacts. The survey data collection process took three 
months from June 2017 and a total of 164 respondents 
agreed to the terms and conditions and completed the survey 
questions.   
B. Survey Results 
From the classifying questions within the survey, it can 
be noted that the respondents are mostly between the ages of 
26 and 55 (76%) while 86% are full time employed (Table 
III) and 74% are based within the United Kingdom. 
Additionally, only 2 out of the 144 respondents reportedly do 
not use the internet on a daily basis (both in the age group 
“56 years old or older”). The good proportional presentation 
by the age groups between 26 and 55 lines up well with the 
results from a recent large study by the Office for National 
Statistics which found 97% of adults aged between 35-54 
frequently used the internet in 2017 [30]. But it would have 
been better to also get a higher proportion of participants 
aged between 19 and 25 since this younger age group is 
similarly active on the internet [30]. Overall these metrics 
verify the relevance of the survey audience since employed, 
UK based adults that frequently use the internet are well 
placed to measure the sensitivity perception of their 
information that might be used by APs across the top twenty 
UK websites. 
TABLE III.  EMPLOYMENT STATUS OF VARIOUS AGE GROUPS 
In which age 
group do you 
fall? 
Are you currently Employed? 
No, I am a 
student 
No, not 
currently 
employed 
Yes, full 
time 
Yes, 
part 
time 
18 years old 
or younger 
1    
19 - 25 years 
old 
3  23 2 
26 - 35 years 
old 
1 1 50 3 
36 – 55 years 
old 
 4 48 3 
56 years old 
or older 
 2 3  
Total 5 7 124 8 
The summarised results of the perceived sensitivity of 
each of the sample parameters are visualised in Fig. 10 with 
the Facebook ID, Google ID, e-mail and IP address notably 
as the most sensitive. 
 
Fig. 10. Survey Parameter Perceived Sensitivity Results 
V. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
 Empowering end-users to monitor, understand and 
validate the data collection practices of advertising platforms 
(APs) was a key motivation for this study. The sensitivity 
perception survey highlighted how e-mail and IP addresses 
have been perceived as high-risk data items and that Google 
and Facebook IDs also generate concern due to the implied 
relation to the additional private information linked to those 
IDs. This justifies the need for a tool that can enable future 
researchers to investigate the AP parameter values efficiently 
and correctly and the design of the new AdPExT 
(Advertising Parameter Extraction Tool) platform presented 
in this paper sufficiently satisfies that requirement.  
 As part of our future work, the tool will be tested through 
a validation process that will compare results generated by 
the tool with manual data extraction results via the freely 
available Firefox Developer Tools network monitor [18]. An 
extension of this study would also enquire to investigate the 
suitability of publishers’ privacy policies as well as the actual 
practices of smaller APs. The AdPExT tool can also be 
enhanced with additional automation and reporting 
capabilities. Other related topics that can be researched 
include the impact of using a mixture of normal and private 
browsing (e.g. Incognito mode in Google Chrome) [31] on 
the quality of information gleaned by APs.  
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